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STATEMENT OF THE CASE 
This is an action by appellant (plaintiff) to collect benefits 
under a policy of disability insurance written by respondent (defendant). 
Appellant allowed the policy to expire by failing to pay the premium when 
the same became due. After the policy was out of force and two days 
after the appellant had suffered a heart attack and was confined in 
a local hospital, someone on his behalf, tendered the prenium to a clerk 
at the office of the local agent of respondent. 
The issue presented to the Court below and on this appeal, 
is whether appellant was entitled to retroactive coverage. 
DISPOSITION BELOW 
Summary judgment was granted to respondent by Judge Marcellus K. 
Snow. 
RELIEF SOUGHT 
Affirmation of the Summary Judgment. 
STATEMENT OF FACTS 
The Complaint of plaintiff and the Exhibits thereto attached, 
set forth all of the factual elements necessary to sustain the summary 
judgment. There are no disputed facts. Respondent moves the Court 
belcw for summary judgment based upon the Complaint of plaintiff contending 
that there is no genuine issue of material fact and that respondent is 
entitled to summary judgment as a matter of law. 
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Respondent does not take exception to the facts as stated by 
appellant in his brief, but does take exception to the inferences 
and argument set forth in that statement. It is, therefore, necessary 
that a more concise statement of facts be presented. 
The insurance contract forming the basis of this lawsuit 
is attached to plaintiff's Complaint as Exhibit (A) (R. 6). The 
policy was issued April 12, 1973. The quarterly premium was $23.73. 
The policy remained in force continuously until February, 1974. 
On February 12, 1974, a quarterly premium became due, but was not 
paid. The policy contains a standard grace period which reads: 
"Unless the company has given notice of its intentions 
not to renew this Policy as provided on the face of the 
Policy a grace period of 31 days will be granted for the 
payment of each premium falling due after the first premium 
during which grace period the Policy shall continue in force." 
There is no evidence that a premium was paid or tendered during the 
grace period and hence, the policy lapsed and was out of force at 
the latest on March 15, 1974. 
On March 25, 1974, appellant suffered a disabling heart attack 
and was confined in a local hospital. 
On March 27, 1974, two days after appellant had suffered his 
heart attack, someone on his behalf, went to the office of defendant's 
agent and tendered the quarterly premium. A receipt for the premium was 
given and is attached to the Complaint as Exhibit (C) (R. 11). 
Some time following the expiration of the grace period, appellant 
received a "late payment offer" from respondent's agent, Robert B. Leonard. 
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The date the "late payment offer'1 was received by appellant is not 
in evidence, but it is alleged by plaintiff that the premium was 
tendered on the 27th of March in reliance on such offer. So, we 
may assume that the offer arrived on or before March 27, 1974. 
The essential fact is that the premium was not tendered 
until after appellant suffered his disabling illness. On that date, 
the policy was out of force, the grace period had expired. 
The issue thus presented is whether the tender of payment 
reinstated the policy and if reinstated, the narrow question is 
whether it was reinstated retroactively or prospectively only. 
ARGUMENT 
POINT I. 
RESPONDENT IS ENTITLED TO JUDGMENT AS 
A MATTER OF LAW AND SUMMARY JUDGMENT WAS 
PROPER. 
Appellant, under Point II. of his brief, argues that summary 
judgment is precluded because (1) the late payment offer can be 
construed to extend the grace period and (2) that if not so construed, 
the late payment offer can be construed as a waiver or estoppel of 
respondent's right to deny coverage (Brief of appellant, page 12). 
Appellant's reasoning is fallacious because he ignores the uncontroverted 
facts of the case and the elementary legal rationale of sunmary judgment 
procedure. 
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Appellant pleaded all facts essential to a determination of 
this case, i.e., the contract, the fact of nonpayment, the date of 
disability, the later date of payment and the "late payment offer". 
Examine the brief of appellant. It is silent as to any claim that 
there is a disputed factual matter in this case that will have a 
bearing on the ultimate determination, if the case were later tried. 
Viewed in proper legal perspective, appellant is simply asking this 
Court to "construe" the Late Payment Offer differently than the 
interpretation of the trial court. It is elementary that the construction 
and interpretation of legal instruments is purely a matter of law for 
the Court. A tandem observation is that if the facts are given and 
not disputed, there is no function remaining for the trier of fact. 
This principle is embodied in Rule 56 UECP: 
". . . . Judgment sought shall be rendered forthwith if 
the pleadings, depositions, answers to interrogatories and 
admissions on file, together with the affidavits, if any, 
shew that there is no genuine issue as to any material 
fact and that the moving party is entitled to a judgment 
as a matter of law. . . . " 
The Utah Supreme Court in numerous analogous cases, supports 
the principle set forth above. Robinson v. Employer's Liability 
Assurance Corporation, 28 Ut.2d 163, 450 P.2d. 91. Gibbs v. St. Paul 
Fire and Marine Insurance Company, 22 Ut.2d 263, 451 P.2d. 776. State 
Farm Mutual Autcroobile Insurance Company v. Strang, 27 Ut.2d 362, 496 
P.2d 707. Leininger v. Stearns-Roger Manufacturing Company, 17 Ut.2d 37, 
404 P.2d 33. F.M.A. Financial Corporation v. Build, Inc., 17 Ut.2d 80, 
404 P.2d 670. Security Title Company v. Payless Builders Supply, 
17 Ut.2d 179, 407 P.2d 141. Mastic Tile Division of Ruberoid Co. v. 
Acme Distributing Company, 15 Ut.2d 136, 389 P.2d 56. 
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A correlary point that should be considered by the Court 
is the assertion of appellant that the legal instruments involved 
can be "construed" differently by the appellate court. A fundamental 
rule of appellate procedure which defeats appellant's position, is 
that an appellate court should not substitute its judgment as to the 
construction and interpretation of written instruments for that of 
the trial court, unless clearly erroneous. 
Appellant does not claim error. His claim is only that he 
lost below and that he would like this court to interpret the evidence 
differently. See Brigham v. Moon Lake Electric Association 24 U.2d 292. 
POINT II. 
ACCEPTANCE OF THE PREMIUM AFTER THE DATE 
OF DISABILITY, DID NOT PROVIDE RETROACTIVE 
COVERAGE. 
The true inquiry in this case, is the reinstatement clause 
of the policy. The question is whether the acceptance of the premium 
by the agent of respondent, reinstated the policy and if it did, was 
the reinstatement retroactive. 
The relationship between an insurance company and its policy 
holder is first governed by applicable statute and second, by the 
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terms of the contract existing between them. In the State of Utah, 
the legislature in adopting its insurance code, has provided seme 
very specific provisions in the matter of accident and sickness 
policies. Title 31-33-7 provides that such policy must contain 
the following provisions: 
"Reinstatement. — provision as follows: REINSmiEMENT: 
If any renewal premium be not paid within the time granted 
the insured for payment, a subsequent acceptance of premium 
by the insurer or by any agent duly authorized by the insurer 
to accept such premium, without requiring in connection 
therewith an application for reinstatement, shall reinstate 
the policy; provided, however, that if the insurer or such 
agent requires an application for reinstatement and issues 
a conditional receipt for the premium tendered, the policy 
will be reinstated upon approval of such application by the 
insurer or, lacking such approval, upon the forty-fifth day 
following the date of such conditional receipt unless the 
insurer has previously notified the insured in writing of 
its disapproval of such application. The reinstated policy 
shall cover only loss resulting from such accidental injury 
as may be sustained after the date of reinstatement and 
loss due to such sickness as may begin more than ten days 
after such date. In all other respects the insured and insurer 
shall have the same rights thereunder as they had under the 
policy immediately before the due date of the defaulted premium, 
subject to any provisions endorsed hereon or attached hereto 
in connection with the reinstatement. Any premium accepted 
in connection with a reinstatement shall be applied to a 
period for which premium has not been previously paid, but 
not to any period more than sixty days prior to the date of 
reinstatement. 
The last sentence of the above provision may be emitted 
from any policy which the insured has the right to continue 
in force subject to its terms by the timely payment of premium 
until at least age fifty, or, in the case of a policy issued 
after age 44, for at least five years from its date of issue." 
(Emphasis added) 
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The policy in this case (Exhibit "A" to the Complaint) follows 
the statute almost verbatim it reads: 
"Reinstatement: If any renewal premium is not paid 
within the time granted the insured for payment, a subsequent 
acceptance of premium by the Company or by an agent duly authorized 
by the Company to accept such premium, without requiring an 
application for reinstatement, will reinstate the Policy, 
provided, however, that if the Company or such agent requires 
an application for reinstatement and issues a conditional 
receipt for the premium tendered, the Policy will be reinstated 
upon approval of such application by the Company or, lacking 
such approval, upon the forty-fifth day following the date 
of such conditional receipt unless the Company has previously 
notified the Insured in writing of its disapproval of such 
application. The reinstated Policy shall cover only loss 
resulting from such accidental injury as may be sustained after 
the date of reinstatement and loss due to such sickness as 
may begin more than five days after such date. In all other 
respects the insured and Company shall have the same rights 
thereunder as they had under the Policy immediately before 
the due date of the defaulted premium, subject to any provisions 
endorsed hereon or attached hereto in connection with the 
reinstatement." 
The statutory regulation followed by the policy is clear, 
unambiguous and unmistakable. Reinstatement covers only accidents 
and illnesses occurring after the date of reinstatement and conversely 
does not cover accidents and injuries which occur while the policy 
is out of force, as in this case. 
Text book authority supports the provision of the Utah statute. 
43 AmJur2d, Sec. 394: 
"The courts generally agree that in the case of a 
lapsed life insurance policy the reinstatement relates back 
to the date of lapse. But as to health and accident policies, 
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the prevailing rule is that reinstateranet has a prospective 
effect dating frcm the time of reinstatement. Accordingly, 
the acceptance of overdue premiums after a default for non-
payment entitles the insured to future coverage only, thus 
precluding a retroactive application of the premium." 
A Utah case of controlling precedence where the foregoing principle 
finds expression, is Cooper v. Foresters Underwriters„2 Ut^2d 373, 
275 P.2d 675: 
"As to the effect of the reinstatement of the policy, the 
certificate provides: 
" (4) If default be made in the payment of the agreed 
premium for this Certificate, the subsequent acceptance of a prerciium 
by the Organization or by any of its duly authorized agents 
shall reinstate the Certificate, but only to cover accidental 
injury thereafter sustained and such sickness as may begin 
more than ten (10) days after the date of such acceptance." 
* * * 
. . . . "As to the October 1st acceptance, the contract 
was reinstated in accordance with the provision of the policy; 
likewise the payment made on October 31st. Plaintiff must 
be charged with the knowledge of her contract and we cannot 
find that any belief that the company would accept late payments 
as a continuation of the policy rather than a reinstatement 
could be reasonably induced by the company's behavior. She 
had a right to reinstate subject to the exclusion of any 
accident occurring prior to the acceptance of the premium and 
could not reasonably have believed that the acceptance of the 
premium was to cover the entire period of time preceding." 
The statute, the insurance policy and the Utah case on this 
subject point conclusively to the fact that the plaintiff had no 
coverage. His policy had lapsed prior to the date that he suffered 
a heart attack and the heart attack occurred two days before he 
tendered the premium to respondent. 
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POINT III. 
THE LATE PAYMENT OFFER DID NOT EXTEND THE 
GRACE PERIOD OR CONSTITUTE A WAIVER OF 
THE REINSTATEMENT PROVISION OF THE POLICY 
OR ESTOP RESPONDENT FROM DENYING COVERAGE. 
Appellant admits that the policy with its grace period 
clause, reinstatement clause and the Late Payment Offer, should 
be construed together, but argues that the Late Payment Offer may 
be interpreted to mean that the instrument extended the grace period 
and provided continuous coverage, even though the premium payment 
was tendered after illness occurred. 
Examination of the Late Payment Offer does not lend itself 
to the construction contended for by appellant. The key phrase 
in the document is this: 
"Your grace period expired 30 days after the due date 
shown, but this offer gives you an additional 15 days to 
pay. . . . if all persons insured are still alive." 
Appellant would, of course, be charged with knowledge that 
there would be no coverage if payment were made after the insured 
died. Certainly, any reasonable person would also be put on inquiry 
as to whether there would be coverage if the premium were paid after 
disability occurred. His policy unequivocally states that there is 
no coverage for illnesses occurring prior to the date of receipt of 
the premium. The only effect of the Late Payment Offer is to allow 
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the insured to reinstate the policy after the expiration of the 
grace period without payment of interest, proof of insurability, 
or the requirement of additional forms. There is nothing contained 
in the offer that would indicate that the company would waive the 
reinstatement clause of the policy or in any other manner provide 
continuous coverage. 
The interpretation contended for by appellant is based purely 
on argument. He cites no authoritative case to support his position 
that a notice such as the one given in this case, constitutes an 
extension of the grace period. 
In an analogous situation involving a life insurance policy, 
the Supreme Court has discussed the matter of premium acceptance 
after the expiration of the grace period, where in the interim, the 
company has forwarded notices and letters to the insured. In the 
case of Ballard v. Beneficial Life Insurance Company 21 P.2d 847, 
the insured failed to pay the premium and the grace period had expired. 
Subsequently, the company wrote to the insured offering to reinstate 
the policy or assist him so that his insurance would be continuous. 
The insured did not forward the premium until after he became hospitalized 
and shortly before he died. The court ruled that the letters and other 
activities of the insurance company did not amount to an estoppel or 
waiver of the provisions of the policy relative to reinstatement. 
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The Court quotes with approval, language from another case 
that is particularly appropriate to the case at bar. 
"As heretofore observed, let it be conceded that the 
adjudicated cases are not in entire harmony. Hence, in following 
the one or the other line of cases and in considering the 
conclusion to be reached as to whether on the stated facts 
a waiver or an estoppel either in law or in fact resulted, 
we should be guided and influenced by those thought 
to be the better founded on conceded basic and fundamental 
principles of law applicable to the subject under consideration. 
That principle, as we believe, and particularly here applicable, 
is well stated by Mr. Justice Field in the case of Globe 
Mut. Life Ins. Co. v. Wolff, supra, that: "Not only should 
the company have been informed of the forfeiture before it 
could be held by its action to have waived it, but it should 
also have been informed of the condition of the health of the 
insured at the time the premium was tendered, upon the payment 
of which the waiver is claimed. The doctrine of waiver, as 
asserted against insurance companies to avoid the strict 
enforcement of conditions contained in their policies, is only 
another name for the doctrine of estoppel. It can only be 
invoked where the conduct of the companies has been such as 
to induce action in reliance upon it, and where it would 
operate as a fraud upon the assured if they were afterwards 
allowed to disavow their conduct and enforce the conditions. 
To a just application of this doctrine it is essential that 
the company sought to be estopped from denying the waiver 
claimed should be apprised of all the facts: of those which 
create the forfeiture, and of those which will necessarily 
influence its judgment in consenting to waive it. The holder 
of the policy cannot be permitted to conceal from the company 
an important fact, like that of the insured being in extremis, 
and then to claim a waiver of the forfeiture created by the 
act which brought the insured to that condition. To permit 
such concealment, and yet to give to the action of the company 
the same effect as though no concealment were made, would tend 
to sanction a fraud on the part of the policyholder, instead 
of protecting him against the commission of one by the company." 
See also Wood v. Beneficial Life Insurance Company, 37 P.2d 544 
(Utah). 
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The position of appellant is that the Late Payment Offer 
without more, constitutes a waiver or estoppel against the 
insurance. Appellant overlooks the fact that there is no 
evidence in this record to shew that the insurance company had 
any knowledge that appellant had suffered a heart attack prior to 
the time that the premium was tendered. As in the Ballard case, 
supra, all jurisdictions in this country that have ruled on 
this question, have stated that knowledge on the part of the 
insurer of loss during the defaulted period, is a necessary element 
for the claimant to prove before waiver or estoppel can be considered. 
These cases are collected in 7 ALR 3d, 414 Sec. 4(a). 
CONCLUSION 
The facts necessary to a determination of this case, are 
in the record and pleaded by appellant in his complaint. The grace 
period had expired before the appellant tendered the overdue payment. 
Two days before payment was tendered, he suffered a disabling heart 
attack. There is no evidence that the insurance company had any 
knowledge of the loss on the date that the premium was received. 
The record also shews that the premium was returned to the appellant 
when knowledge of the loss became known. 
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It is obvious that appellant was attempting to retrieve 
insurance benefits that he, through his own neglect, had lost. 
There is no evidence that respondent had extended the grace 
period or waived the reinstatement provisions of the policy. As 
quoted in the Utah case of Cooper v. Foresters Underwriters, supra, 
"A waiver of default in the payment of premiums cannot be based 
on a mere expression of willingness to reinstate the policy on easy 
terms". 
Hence, Summary Judgment was appropriately entered in favor of 
respondent. .* 
DATED this y day of August, 1976. 
Respectively submitted, 
HANSON ^GARRETT 
By S^SlSAAAJ-^ ^ O 
EDWARD M. GARRETT 
THOMAS L. ROBERTS 
I hereby certify that I mailed a copy of the foregoing 
Respondent's Brief to Samuel King, King & Schumacher, attorneys 
for plaintiff-appellant, at 409 Boston Building, Salt Lake City, 
Utah 84111 this y day of August, 1976. 
Secretary 
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